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1. Introduction 
 
The principle of integrity emerges in various contexts and seems applicable to a broad range of 
entities. For example, one may speak about the integrity of nations (to be safeguarded from 
external intrusions), about the integrity of lab animals (exposed to animal experimentation and 
genetic modification) or even about the integrity of species (endangered by biotechnology). We 
may also speak about integrity as a virtue, pertaining to a human subject, for instance when 
referring to the integrity of politicians or physicians. In my paper, I will restrict myself to the 
integrity of one particular ‘entity’, namely the human body, an issue that is complicated and 
perplexing enough for one paper. Can we, as Peter Kemp elsewhere in this volume phrases it, 
advance from mere perplexity to complexity? I think we can. 
The human body is not an entity that is simply present within our world, not something 
which is ready-at-hand. We are a body, we are embodied beings; our existence is grounded in 
embodiment (Zaner 1971). Yet, in the course of history, several basic possibilities of 
experiencing our body have emerged. Therefore, no single explanation of the intriguing 
phenomena of bodily existence (not even the modern scientific one) can be taken for granted or 
regarded as incontestable. 
The basic contention of my paper is that bodily integrity is an ethical principle in its own 
right, closely connected with, but still fundamentally different from the principle of personal 
autonomy. It is to be regarded as one of the basic signifiers or markers of ethics. The meaning of 
integrity, however, is far from unambiguous. My paper will consist of three parts. The first part 
entails a concise (rudimentary) conceptual analysis of the term integrity as such. The second part 
entails a brief historical detour, an overview of the functions it has fulfilled during important 
epochs in the history of the human body. Finally, I will consider the way in which the principle 
of integrity currently functions in deliberations concerning organ transplantation. All three parts 
(the conceptual and the historical part, as well as the part on ‘application’) address the same 
question: What is integrity? In order to answer this question, we must become aware of the 
multiple possible meanings (some more apparent, others more hidden) that have become 
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attached to ‘integrity’ as an ethical signifier. So doing, I will explain why I consider it both 
legitimate and necessary for integrity to remain available as a basic marker or principle in ethics. 
 
2. Conceptual Analysis: Integrity and Vulnerability 
 
Integrity is derived from the Latin verb integrare and literally means wholeness, completeness, 
intactness. The term integrity refers to the body as a meaningful whole, an integrated unity, an 
intact totality. As Peter Kemp (in this volume) already pointed out, intactness is closely 
connected with the verb tangere, to touch. The word in-tact-ness is literally derived from it. In-
tact simply means un-touched. Integrity refers to an intact (untouched) totality, or rather: 
something which ought not to be touched. The term reminds us of the biblical phrase Noli me 
tangere, uttered by Jesus during his final spooky-risqué meeting with Mary of Magdalene and 
recorded in the Gospel of John: do not touch me, I am still vulnerable. As we will see, however, 
there is from the very outset a basic tension between the ontological and the ethical dimension of 
the concept, between the ontological claim that the human body is in itself an intact totality, and 
the ethical claim that the human body must be regarded as if it were an intact totality, and that 
the human body ought not to be touched (unless conclusive justification is available). 
The term integrity can be further clarified by considering its close relationship with the 
term vulnerability. Unlike integrity, vulnerability must not be regarded as a principle in its own 
right. Rather, vulnerability refers to the actual state of things. It indicates what we as human 
individuals really are: vulnerable beings. Our bodies are entities whose intactness will always 
remain vulnerable, and integrity functions as an ethical principle precisely because we are 
vulnerable, because our bodily intactness is in danger as soon as we participate in social 
intercourse. Integrity is a compensating principle that indicates (in general terms) how the 
interaction between vulnerable, corporeal beings can be organized in a moral manner. In this 
respect, the functioning of the principle of integrity is quite comparable to the functioning of the 
principle of autonomy in other areas. Whereas dependence indicates the actual state of things 
(human beings are actually and inevitably highly dependent upon one another), the principle of 
autonomy points out (in general terms) how the interaction between dependent human beings 
should be organized in a moral manner. In both cases, the ethical principle is an explicit negation 
of the ‘natural’ state of things. Terms like vulnerability and dependence remind us of our initial, 
original situation. Terms like integrity and autonomy, on the other hand, point out what human  
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life would look like under ideal conditions. Yet, the basic principles of morality are bound to 
realize themselves as we allow our actual behaviour to be increasingly regulated by them. This is 
the moral progress that can be detected in history (if we are willing to consider the recorded facts 
optimistically enough). 
Yet, as soon as we proceed with our analysis, the principle of integrity shows itself to be 
everything but unequivocal. Several basic possibilities for understanding the principle of 
integrity present themselves. Again, this is quite comparable with the principle of autonomy. If 
we interpret autonomy in accordance with the liberal tradition of Locke and others for example 
(as Tristram Engelhardt and others have done), autonomy is identified with the basic ability of 
persons to give or withhold their permission or consent. If we interpret it along Kantian lines, 
however, autonomy will rather indicate the basic possibility of the moral subject to act in 
accordance with the Law of Reason. And if we interpret it in Christian terms, autonomy is the 
right not to be impeded in living a religious life. Likewise, there are several basic, more or less 
equivalent possibilities for interpreting the principle of integrity. In this contribution, two such 
possibilities will be considered, namely the Liberal and the Christian understanding. 
According to the Liberal understanding of integrity, I (the human person) am the owner 
of my body. No one has the right to intrude upon, or use my body (or parts of my body) without 
my consent. No one is entitled to violate the integrity of my body without my permission, simply 
because it is my body. Although still a moral concept, integrity has become a juridical term as 
well. Ownership and consent are the basic issues. In principle, my body is not at the disposal of 
others. Within a Liberal perspective, however, a more radical and a more moderate elaboration 
can be distinguished. In the one case, ownership of the body is regarded as absolute. The human 
person has full ownership over his / her body. He / she is the owner and has the right to use his / 
her body as he / she likes. If someone wants to sell parts of his / her body, mutilate it, or 
drastically change it by means of surgery (in the absence of medica1 necessity), no one can deny 
him / her the right to do so. In a more moderate interpretation of ownership, however, to own 
your body is comparable to owning a work of art. Ownership does not imply the right to damage 
it, or drastically alter it. Rather, its intactness has to be respected and protected. This is a duty the 
owner qua owner has. Likewise, although we are the owners of our body, we are not entitled to 
destroy it, and our moral sway over it is limited. 
What basically characterizes the Liberal understanding of integrity is that it emphasizes 
the duty of others to respect the integrity of my body. The Christian tradition, however, primarily  
focusses on my own duties towards my body, rather than on those of others. What basically 
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distinguishes the Christian understanding of integrity from the Liberal one is that the Christian 
understanding stipulates the obligations I myself have with regard to my own body. I am not the 
owner, but rather the steward of my body. My basic moral condition is one of stewardship, rather 
than ownership. The ethical implication of this is that I have to manage and care for my body in 
such a manner that its integrity, intactness and wholeness is safeguarded and secured. The body 
is temporarily placed under my guardianship and trust, but the true owner of the body remains 
He who created it. 
Michel Foucault (1994) has explained how the Christian view of body management 
differed from the Greek and Roman ethic of body-management, in vogue during antiquity. 
Similar to the Christian view, he tells us, the Greeks and Romans took it for granted that the 
ethical principles concerning the body indicate the way in which we ourselves are to manage our 
own body, and to make use of the possibilities it offers. Yet, whereas the Greek and Roman ethic 
was directed at self-mastery and temperance, in the Christian era this ‘manly’ model of body-
management (emphasizing self-mastery) gave way to a more ‘feminine’, Christian model 
(emphasizing the preservation of integrity). From now on, Christians had to preserve the 
intactness, the integrity of their body. This is clearly pointed out to us, for example, by Paul in 
his first Epistle to the Corinthians. Our bodies, he tells us, are the organs and limbs of our Lord 
and master (6:15). We are not to spoil our body, because it belongs to God. The body is God’s 
temple (3:16-17). It is not for fornication, it is for the Lord (6:13). We do not belong to 
ourselves, but are to honour the true Owner through the way we keep our bodies (6:19-20). 
We are now already entering the history of the moral significance of the body. Three 
historical models seem to present themselves, namely self-mastery, stewardship and ownership. 
In at least in two of them (namely Christian stewardship and liberal ownership), bodily integrity 
functions as a key issue. Let us look into these historical models, these basic possibilities for 
experiencing the body more extensively. 
 
3. Historical overview 
 
a. Antiquity 
Although Foucault rightly observed that the body ethic of antiquity was formulated mainly in 
terms of self-mastery, this does not mean that the notion of integrity was completely absent at 
that time. To begin with, the idea of integrity was artistically visualized in a rather prominent 
way. The human body was idealized in an unprecedented manner by ancient art-works, ancient 
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sculptures. The plastic arts of antiquity produced countless statues that portrayed the ideal image 
of the human body as an intact whole, thus conveying and furthering the idea of physical 
integrity. Jacques Lacan pointed out that the very idea of human dignity first impressed itself on 
the minds of ancient Europeans via these statues that were erected alongside roman roads (1981, 
23:3). These statues opened up a moral dimension that had not been there before. They indicated 
that there is something in human beings, even in their physical appearance, that demands respect. 
Thus, they inserted a new moral principle into the world. In the course of history, however, a 
shift gradually occurred from a more or less aesthetical towards a legal, and from an ontological 
towards an ethical understanding of integrity. 
The idea of integrity, in the sense of physical completeness and intactness, was also 
present in the ethico-medical discourse of antiquity. As Lacan (1994) rightly points out, during 
antiquity the heavenly bodies functioned as the ideal image and standard of completeness. One 
of antiquity’s basic intuitions was that unimpeded, undisturbed movement would result in a 
spherical form, a perfectly circular orbit. Under ideal circumstances, human life would be as 
spherical as the shape and orbit of heavenly bodies, although in real life, human beings meet with 
all sorts of disturbances and violations, thus experiencing all sorts of intrusions and deficiencies. 
Our intactness proves rather vulnerable. Yet, the heavenly bodies remained the ancient standard 
of human perfection. This influential view found itself relentlessly ridiculed by Aristophanes in 
Plato’s Symposium, where he took the logic of sphericality to its absurd extreme by arguing that, 
originally, human bodies must have been completely spherical, which means having four feet, 
four arms, two genitals (forever united), etcetera. Zeus dissected the representatives of this 
original race, however, and ever since the human body displays the scars that indicate the loss of 
this primordial integrity or wholeness. In short, the desire to restore one’s physical integrity is 
but a ridiculous dream, according to Aristophanes. 
 
b. Medieval Christianity 
Throughout the middle ages, there was a clear awareness concerning the vulnerabilities and 
deficiencies of the ‘real’ human body. Nonetheless, the idea of the body as a complete whole 
flourished as well, amounting even to its glorification. Although we have become used to stories 
(by Nietzsche and others) that tell us how intensely Christianity despises the body, and how 
eagerly it endorses a negative view on bodily life, this is a rather one-sided picture. God has 
established the human body with the best possible constitution, Thomas Aquinas tells us, and we 
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could not have been better fashioned (1922, Ia. 91,3). According to medieval discourse, the 
actual integrity and dignity of the body is something which is presently lost, but may be re-
established. In fact, the present condition of the human body is situated between two extremely 
powerful images of bodily intactness. 
The first medieval image of bodily intactness pertained to humans in statu innocentiae, 
that is: in Paradise. In his Summa Theologica Thomas Aquinas provides us with a charming 
“theological fantasy” (Bernath 1969, p. 73) of bodily life in Eden, under ideal, utopian 
circumstances. Like the heavenly bodies (but due to God’s supernatural support), human bodies 
in Paradise were incorruptible, imperishable, unimpeded, un-intruded (Ia.97, 2). They did not 
suffer, they only enjoyed. Their bodies did not sweat nor smell, and although they did consume 
food and therefore defecated, their excrements had nothing disgusting or indecent about them 
(Ia.97,4). They had intercourse with one another, but without harming their integrity by doing so, 
while the pleasures they experienced were much more intense than they are at present (Ia.98, 2). 
In its present state, the human body is no doubt corruptible and vulnerable. It is indeed a 
suffering, ageing, smelling, defecating body, damaged by disease and improper food, unable to 
copulate without endangering its integrity. In short, medieval theology basically subscribes to an 
image of the body in terms of deficiency and lack. But this does not mean that the body is 
despised altogether. Rather, we are to guard and protect what is left of its integrity most 
carefully. Integrity no longer functions as a description of the actual state of things, but rather as 
an ethical ideal, an ethical demand. While eating and drinking, while having sex and getting 
married, in short: while performing all the necessities of sublunary life, the preservation of 
integrity functions as a basic moral standard for proper human conduct. 
A second forceful medieval image of bodily intactness and completeness pertained to a 
future existence of body and soul, forever united, beyond history. As long as the soul, after 
departing from its earthly existence, dwells in heaven without the body, Thomas Aquinas and 
other scholastics tell us, its happiness cannot be complete. Christians for many centuries 
sincerely believed in the resurrection of the body, the glorification and transfiguration of the 
body on Resurrection Day. Even in heaven we remain incomplete (and cannot experience 
complete enjoyment) as long as our bodies are not restored to us. Paul, in his first Epistle to the 
Corinthians, after comparing the splendour of earthly bodies with the splendour of heavenly ones 
(15:40), assures us that what is sown as perishable will be raised imperishable. At the last 
trumpet-call, we shall not die but we shall all be transfigured, in a flash. The dead will rise 
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imperishable and their resurrected body no longer display the injuries and deficiencies of the 
‘real’ one (15: 42-53). It will be a corpus gloriosum, resulting from a restitutio ad integrum. 
 
c. The Renaissance 
The Renaissance witnesses a remarkable resurgence of the ancient idea that bodily perfection can 
be realized within the context of mundane existence. By means of self-care and exercise, man is 
able to improve himself into an elegantly cultivated harmonious body and to realize the typical 
grandeur of Renaissance man. The 
Renaissance quest for bodily 
perfection basically relied on the 
idea of ideal proportion. The 
Renaissance body was both a work 
of art and an object of science. Its 
representation of the body amounted 
to an idealization, an effort to present 
the body as a perfectly harmonious 
Gestalt. The body as an ideal image 
thus functioned as a symbol 
conveying the idea of humanity and 
human dignity. 
A very telling representative 
of this artistic experience of bodily 
existence is no doubt Da Vinci, most 
notably his famous drawing known 
as The proportions of the human figure. It presents us with an ideal aesthetical image of human 
perfection (cf. Zwart 1998b). This is stressed by the spherical nature of human form and 
movement, indicated by the circle.  According to the Renaissance ideal, the moving hands and 
feet of the human body adhere to a circular scheme. Yet, something fundamental is about to 
change. Another, more modern view of the human body is already visible in the drawing. Notice 
the presence of the square, moving the body into a different kind of space, one which allows it to 
become quantifiable, to become determined in terms of spatial extension, a space form that is 
structured by the coordinate system of Descartes.  
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Whereas the ancient and medieval body (from Plato up to Hildegard von Bingen and 
Thomas Aquinas) remained firmly under the sway of the circle, the modern body image will 
become subjected to the sway of the square. In Da Vinci’s drawing, the aesthetical and the 
mathematical, the circle and the square rival one another for precedence. 
In subsequent drawings by Leonardo, the emphasis gradually shifts from ideal proportion 
to empirical reality. Blood circulation, the respiratory system, the urological system and other 
‘systems’ are carefully disentangled from one another, are dissected separately, removed from 
the body as a unitary whole. The body is increasingly described in mechanistic terms. In fact, 
Leonardo’s anatomical studies partly coincided with his ingenious hydraulic and mechanical 
studies and inventions (Zwart 1998b). He increasingly adheres to a mechanical and modern 
perception of bodily life. The presence of the square (as a symbol of modern topology) in his 
earlier drawing already announced the emergence of a different, ‘Cartesian’ gaze. 
 
d. Modernity 
Once the square (as an emblem of modern mathematics) is firmly established, the circle is bound 
to disappear. The body’s integrity is disregarded and dissolved, the body is measured, dissected, 
invaded and exposed. In later drawings by Da Vinci, the body is already opened up, and in the 
body’s inside the anatomist Da Vinci does not discover a beautiful, perfect whole, but rather a set 
of systems composed of tubes, pipes, pumps and passages; something like a hydrodynamic 
machine. Due to the powerful gaze of modern medicine, the body increasingly falls apart, 
eventually even pulverizing into chemical substances like proteins and finally the nucleotides of 
DNA. 
Yet, at the same time, the integrity of the body is rediscovered and reaffirmed by modern 
science. The Integrity of the Body is the title of a book published by E.M. Burnett in 1963. It is 
not about ethics, but about immunity. From the 19
th
 century onwards physicians came to 
understand diseases in terms of specific organisms invading the body from outside. It was 
discovered that the body contains a series of compensating systems and mechanisms for 
preserving its integrity and intactness in the face of these foreign intrusions. The natural state of 
man, Burnett tells us, was not Eden or Heaven. Rather, in their original condition, humans were 
subject to a wide range of parasitic diseases. At present, however, science can assist the body “in 
its demand for maintaining its own integrity” (p. 14), interpreted in terms of “chemical and 
cellular consistency” (p. vi). 
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And yet, although these scientific insights into the mechanisms of immunity can be used 
to support the integrity of the body, immunology as such adheres to the basic tendency of 
modern medical science to dismantle the body’s wholeness and reframe it as an intricate 
compilation of systems, tissues, proteins and particles. Moreover, as medical science advances, 
the integrity of the body becomes a problem in its own right. Notably in the case of organ and 
tissue transplantation, the immune system of the body constitutes a serious obstacle to 
transplantation medicine. As bodily integrity is violated by the invasion of foreign tissues, the 
efforts of the body to restore and maintain its harmed integrity have to be repressed. 
Whereas the integrity of the body is reinterpreted and reaffirmed in immunological terms, 
it finds itself increasingly dissolved by the powerful gaze and intrusions of modern medicine. 
Simultaneously, it is in ethics as a compensatory discourse that the term bodily integrity resurges 
and reaffirms itself. Integrity has now become a moral concept. The threat to the actual integrity 
of the body constituted by modern science is counterbalanced by the ethical demand to preserve 
the integrity of the body in its moral sense. Whereas science increasingly discovers the 
vulnerability of the body, ethics reaffirms its moral integrity and ‘inviolability’. 
 
4. The Case of Organ Transplantation: the Dutch Experience 
 
In The Netherlands, the principle of bodily integrity is affirmed in the Constitution (Zwart and 
Hoffer 1998). Article 11 explicitly states that everyone has a right (in principle) to the 
inviolability of his or her body. One of the reasons for including this article in the Constitution 
was a public debate on the legal status of prisoners. Although it is generally regarded as justified 
to intervene in the private life of prisoners, and to force them to participate for example in the 
daily schedules of prison life, the individuals involved still retain the right to have their physical 
integrity respected. For this reason, it is regarded as unjustified to submit prisoners to corporeal 
punishment or to involve them in medical or scientific experiments without their free and explicit 
consent. Also the emergence of transplantation medicine reinforced the suspicion that in the 
future, the integrity of the body might be endangered. As a result, a liberal Member of 
Parliament successfully advocated the recognition of the principle of integrity as a basic 
constitutional principle in its own right. It is not allowed to intrude upon the integrity of the body 
without the free and explicit consent of the person involved. 
As for organ transplantation, Article 11 discouraged the introduction of a legal system 
(advocated by some) that regarded the harvesting of organs justified if the person involved had 
not explicitly objected to becoming a donor, in favour of a system that regarded the harvesting of 
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organs justified only if the person involved had explicitly consented to it. In those cases in which 
potential donors had not explicitly indicated their preferences, the next of kin, who could now be 
regarded as the ‘owners’ of the body, should be asked for their permission. Recently, however, a 
new law on organ donation was passed. It enabled the government to introduce a system of 
central registration. In 1998 in fact, all adult Dutch citizens received a letter from the Dutch 
Ministry of Health urging them to indicate whether or not they were willing to act as organ- and 
tissue donor in the event of death. It was also possible to authorize the next of kin to take the 
decision. This initiative was accompanied by a series of campaigns informing the public about 
donorship and urging everyone to give ‘Yes’ for an answer, in view of the limited number of 
organs available for transplantation medicine at present. 
It turned out, however, that for a considerable number of citizens, donorship constitutes 
an issue of unease. Campaigns that intended to promote donorship presented the public with 
ideal images of restored intactness, with visions of restored integrity. One particular commercial, 
for example, was about a handsome kidney patient who, after receiving a donated organ, became 
perfectly healthy again and decided to get married, instead of suffering a continuous decrease in 
quality of life and dying a premature death. Images like this one trigger our moral sensibility, no 
doubt, but arouse suspicion as well. Do they tell the whole story? We know, for example, that 
after organ transplantation, the wholeness of the body will only partially be restored. Life-time 
monitoring and continuous intake of medicine (in order to repress the body’s immune system) is 
the inevitable fate of recipients involved. Moreover, the intake of medicine may well in the long 
run undermine and damage physical intactness. 
Furthermore, accounts of family members or health care workers active in Intensive Care 
units may contain uncanny and unsettling tales about what actually happens to bodies that are 
being made available for organ donation. Audiences of such tales may be horrified by the 
inevitable, but often excessive intrusion upon bodily integrity entailed in such stories. On behalf 
of the harvesting of organs, the body is opened up from collarbone to pubis. In order to justify 
such drastic interventions, transplantation medicine relies on a process which I elsewhere 
referred to as digitalization (Zwart 1998b, Zwart and Hoffer 1998). Digitalization demands, for 
example, that it must be beyond dispute whether or not the donor has consented to the harvesting 
of his or her organs, and that it must be beyond dispute whether or not the donor has actually 
died. In order to answer such questions, several techniques of digitalization have been 
introduced, such as the consent procedure (for instance the Dutch system of central registration), 
but also the brain death criterium, adopted by the Dutch government. The principle of autonomy 
also has become an important element within this logic of digitalization, now that autonomy is 
reduced to the presence or absence of explicit consent. 
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Yet, there may be a tension between such ‘clean’ procedures of digitalization and 
concrete experiences of family members. As often happens, before the harvesting of organs, the 
body of a beloved one still seems to be alive. It is still warm, its complexion is still normal, and it 
is being taken care of quite intensively. After the intervention, however, they suddenly find this 
same body to be completely transformed. It has changed into a corpse, it has become cold and 
deadly pale, and it no longer succeeds in capturing the attention of medical personnel. Even if 
they are convinced that the patient had died before the intrusion took place, and even if it is 
beyond doubt that the patient had consented to donorship, instances of moral uneasiness remain. 
Due to the radical intrusion to which the donor’s body was subjected, its integrity is violated in a 
radical, yet morally justified manner. Such embarrassing experiences make it quite clear that the 
principle of autonomy is not the ethical panacea that will take care of all our problems. In order 
to give voice to a persistent sense of uneasiness concerning organ donation, our moral 
vocabulary has to be broadened. 
A radical liberal perspective may readily advocate the ‘recycling’ of bodily parts. It will 
even object to the use of term ‘donation’ as such, with its connotation of ‘gift’ and Christian 
charity. Radical liberalism will rather advocate the commercialization of donorship. In the 19
th
 
century, a radical liberal Member of the British Parliament already advocated the availability of 
‘unclaimed bodies’ - i.e. corpses of inhabitants of workhouses and prisons - for medical research. 
Yet, the practice of organ transplantation is quite at odds with a basic sensibility of long 
standing, namely piety - that is: respect for bodily integrity. And this is far from being a ‘natural’ 
response. For many centuries, Christianity has been combating pagan practices of boiling and 
burning corpses, or of chopping them to pieces. Notwithstanding the actual vulnerability of the 
body, its moral integrity had to be respected. This was, for many centuries, a basic item of moral 
‘training’ throughout Europe. And indeed, Antigone already regarded the sight of her brother’s 
corpse, deserted in the field and exposed to wandering scavengers, as intolerable. All of a 
sudden, however, due to the recent possibility of organ donation, we are urged to re-assess our 
basic intuitions regarding the body’s inviolability, and this is what causes our uneasiness. 
Nevertheless, moral traditions such as Christianity and (moderate) Liberalism also contain 
important notions in favour of donorship, such as charity, solidarity and reciprocity. As the 
Dutch phenomenologist J.H. van den Berg (1961) pointed out, the Christian community had been 
prepared for the rise of transplantation medicine by certain practices of devotion that for many 
decades focused on the Sacred Heart of Christ. In the countless emblems and images produced 
by this religious mass movement, Christ’s merciful heart had already risen to the surface of His 
body, had already become visible and tangible, available to others: almost ready to donate. And 
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this emblem of charity compensated for and counter-acted the deeply rooted theological 
emphasis on the preservation of post-mortal intactness. 
 
5. Final Considerations: Real Violability and Moral Inviolability 
 
Within the concept of integrity, a basic tension exists between its ethical and its ontological 
dimension. During antiquity, as well as during the Renaissance, the idea of actual physical 
perfection flourished, but without being incontestable. In antiquity, for example, it was ridiculed 
by Aristophanes, and during the Renaissance the basic figure of the circle was already eclipsed 
by the square. In medieval theology, Eden and Heaven were regarded as places where full 
ontological integrity had been, or will be, experienced. Under mundane conditions, however, 
individuals have the moral duty to safeguard their body’s incomplete integrity. In modern times, 
aesthetical and ontological understandings of bodily integrity tend to give way to ethical and 
legal ones. Bodily integrity no longer refers to an actual, complete whole, whose real intactness 
has to be furthered or secured. Rather, the concept of bodily integrity increasingly adapts itself to 
the logic of digitalization - everything depends on the presence or absence of consent. Integrity is 
violated if we are touched without our permission, but secured if permission is forwarded. 
Several techniques for obtaining such permission have been developed. 
In short, the principle of integrity is in danger of being completely identified with the 
principle of autonomy, while the latter principle is operationalized solely in terms of voluntary 
consent. If we simply accept this ongoing digitalization of moral principles, however, basic 
aspects of integrity are bound to be neglected and obscured. This becomes apparent as soon as 
the principle is applied to recent moral issues like organ donation. If we allow important markers 
such as integrity to be excluded from the idiom of ethics, or to be appropriated (and eventually 
eclipsed) by a technocratic ethic of consent, our ability to make sense of important moral 
sensitivities will dramatically diminish. 
The principle of integrity will not allow us to solve all our problems, but it remains 
indispensable for structuring an important dimension of our moral world. Whereas the strive for 
actual physical perfection is nowadays regarded as an aesthetical rather than as an ethical pursuit, 
the ethical insight persists that it is problematic in itself to intrude upon something whose 
integrity is vulnerable. In short, integrity no longer serves as a model of physical perfection 
which individuals ought to imitate or copy. Regardless of the actual shape or condition of our 
real, physical / physiological body, integrity or inviolability is something which pertains to our 
moral body. We seem to have two bodies, one violable, the other inviolable. Indeed, it is as if, 
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besides our actual, physical, vulnerable, violable body we are provided with another, imaginary, 
inviolable body, namely the invisible, non-empirical, ethical dimension of bodily existence. 
Regardless of the vulnerable, deficient or even damaged condition of our real body, the 
inviolability of our imaginary, ethical body maintains itself. The moral, inviolable body is, no 
doubt, an ethical fiction, but one which is bound to realize itself as we increasingly manage to 
see its inviolability respected. Whereas the real physical body increasingly loses its integrity - 
due for instance to the ongoing invasion of artificial bones, teeth, joints, organ parts, etcetera - its 
moral inviolability constitutes an issue of growing concern. At the same time, new fictions of 
bodily perfection, new images of complete physical integrity are engendered and encouraged by 
contemporary medicine. Unprecedented technological possibilities, eventually allowing us to 
overcome all physical inconsistencies and deficiencies, may effectuate a drastic renewal of our 
ontological understanding of bodily existence. The question whether this will increasingly allow 
us to adapt our real bodies to the ideal body images we cherish, of whether the integrity of the 
actual body (by means of its immune system for example) will continue to offer resistance, 
remains as yet undecided. 
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